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Conceptual Engineering for Epistemic Norms 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
What makes an epistemic norm distinctively epistemic? 
According to the received view in the literature, if a norm N 
regulates the epistemic properties required for permissibly phi-ing, 
then N is an epistemic norm. 
 This paper is involved in conceptual engineering. It has 
two aims: first, it argues that the received view should be 
abandoned, in that it fails to identify epistemic and only epistemic 
requirements, and it misses fit with the general normative 
landscape. At the same time, I argue, the failure of the received 
view is no reason for skepticism about ‘the epistemic’ as a sui 
generis normative domain. 
 This paper’s second and central aim is an ameliorative 
aim: it proposes a novel approach to individuating epistemic 
norms. In a nutshell, according to the ameliorative proposal I will 
develop here, epistemic norms are to be individuated by their 
association with distinctively epistemic values.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Epistemic concepts such as knowledge and evidence figure 
prominently in our everyday evaluations of each other’s actions 
and mental states. It often comes natural to say things like: ‘Why 
would you believe such a thing? You have no evidence that that’s 
the case!, or to challenge assertions with ‘How do you know?’ 
questions. Moreover, there is a widespread consensus among 
epistemologists that there are distinctively epistemic norms that 
underwrite these evaluations. For instance, many think that there 
is are epistemic norms telling us to believe only what we have 
evidence for and to assert only what we know.    
 This raises the question as to what makes an epistemic 
norm distinctively epistemic, as opposed to say, moral, prudential, 
aesthetic, etc.? It is fair to say that the most widely accepted 
answer to this question is that if a norm regulates the epistemic 
properties required for permissibly phi-ing, then it’s an epistemic 
norm. Let’s call this view CONTENT INDIVIDUATION (CI).1  
 At the same time, not everyone is on board with CI. 
What’s interesting is that, among recent critics of the view, the 
perhaps most prominent view is eliminativism about the 
epistemic. Roughly, the thought here is that there is no 
satisfactory answer to be found to the question as to what makes 
a purportedly epistemic norm distinctively epistemic and that, as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See e.g. (Benton 2014), (Brown 2010), (Maitra 2011), (Lackey 2013), (Gerken 
2014); see also Section #4 for discussion.  
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result, the thing to do is simply remove the term ‘epistemic’ from 
the philosophical lexicon, at least as a modifier of norms.2  
 In previous work, I have extensively argued3 for two 
descriptive claims: (1) That CI is extensionally inadequate, and (2) 
that (1) gets us in trouble in several debates in epistemology and 
beyond. This paper is a paper involved in conceptual 
engineering;4 it abandons the descriptive project and takes on an 
ameliorative approach to the question as to what makes an 
epistemic norm distinctively epistemic. This ameliorative 
approach shares the pessimism of eliminativists about CI and the 
optimism of champions of CI about distinctively epistemic 
norms. It argues that our technical term ‘epistemic norm’ will be 
perfectly able to pick out a respectable normative category once 
we abandon CI as individuation procedure. In a nutshell, 
according to the proposal I will develop here, epistemic norms 
should be individuated by their association with distinctively 
epistemic values. What makes a norm a distinctively epistemic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See e.g. (Hazlett 2016): ‘I argue that “epistemic” is ambiguous: it is sometimes 
used to mean “of or relating to knowledge” and sometimes to mean “of or 
relating to belief.” I raise some worries about this ambiguity, and 
sympathetically consider the prospects for eliminating “epistemic” from our 
philosophical lexicon.’ See also (Cohen 2016) and section #3 for discussion. 
3 See e.g. (Author 2016, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, Forthcomingb). 
4 In line with projects by, among others, people like  Sally Haslanger (2000), 
Herman Cappelen (forthcoming), Matti Eklund (2015), Patrick Greenough (In 
Progress) and Kevin Sharp (2013). 
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norm is the fact that it is associated with an epistemic value. Call 
this view VALUE INDIVIDUATION (VI). 
 Here is a game plan for the remainder of this paper: 
Section #2 motivates the need for an individuation criterion. In 
Section #3 I identify a set of desiderata for a satisfactory way to 
individuate epistemic norms. Section #4 takes a closer look at CI 
and argues that it fails as it does not satisfy a number of the 
relevant desiderata. In Section #5, I introduce VI and argue that 
this view does satisfy the relevant desiderata. Finally, in the last 
section (#6), I conclude. 
 
 
2. Why Care? 
 
Consider the term ‘moral’. It’s no exaggeration to say that this 
term is reasonably well understood even among non-philosophers 
and that we competently deploy it frequently. Just note how often 
we say things like ‘That’s immoral’ or ‘The morally right thing to 
do is such-and-so,’ etc.   
 In this respect there is an important difference between 
the term ‘moral’ and the term ‘epistemic’. The latter is neither well 
understood even among non-philosophers nor is it competently 
deployed very frequently. We don’t say things like ‘That’s 
unepistemic’ or ‘The epistemically right belief to form here is 
such-and-so,’ etc. Unlike ‘moral’, ‘epistemic’ is (still) philosophers’ 
jargon.  
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 One important consequence of this is that the need for a 
criterion for individuating type-specific norms is particularly 
pressing in the case of epistemic norms. Of course, it would be 
nice to have a precise criterion for what makes a certain norm a 
distinctively moral norm. Even so, it may be less pressing here 
since we have some independent handle on the issue thanks to 
our understanding of the term ‘moral’. What’s more, we can use 
intuitions about when ‘moral’/’not moral’ are correctly applicable, 
which embody this understanding, in an effort to (at least partly) 
reverse engineer a relevant criterion. In contrast, in the case of 
‘epistemic’ we don’t have an independent handle on the issue, or 
at least not an equally good one. Likewise, we have considerably 
less reason to be optimistic about a reverse engineering project.  
Of course, this is not to say that we cannot use intuition 
at all. For instance, it seems pretty clear that the norm that one 
ought to change a flat tire on one’s car is not an epistemic norm. 
Rather, the point here is that while the meaning of ‘moral’ may 
well be sufficiently settled to delineate a class of distinctively 
moral norms, the same is not true of ‘epistemic’. By the same 
token, the onus is still on us epistemologists to delineate a class of 
epistemic norms with sufficient clarity. There is a particularly 
pressing need for an individuation criterion here.  
Furthermore, note that even if one is a sceptic about 
epistemic normativity per se, it is undeniable that ‘epistemic 
norms’ exist as a technical term: philosophers have been debating 
over the correct ‘epistemic norm’ for belief, judgment, practical 
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reasoning, action, assertion, telling, explaining for several decades 
already. Here is Stew Cohen (who credits Jessica Brown for this 
objection): 
Perhaps technical expressions can have more in 
common with natural language expressions than I am 
allowing. How do natural language expressions get 
their meaning? Certainly, a large part of the story is 
that they acquire their meaning by being used in a 
particular way by a community of speakers. Can we 
say that a technical term like 'epistemic' acquires its 
meaning by being used in a particular way by a very 
specialized community--the community of 
epistemologists? If so, then when epistemologists talk 
about epistemic justification, what they are talking 
about is determined by how they have been using 
that expression (2016, 7). 
 
Even if one doubts the normative force of the epistemic 
domain, then, there is still pressing need to get clear on what we 
are talking about (or in the business of talking about) when we 
talk about epistemic norms. Indeed, sceptics themselves need a 
clearly defined technical notion of ‘epistemic norm’ in order to 
even get started in the business of denying that the technical term 
maps on to anything in the normative landscape proper.   
This need is further exacerbated by the fact that, without 
a clear individuation criterion, epistemologists might end up 
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talking past each other when the debate such things as epistemic 
justification, the epistemic norm of assertion, etc. This worry has 
been voiced by Jennifer Lackey in connection to the epistemic 
norm of assertion:  
 
For now, whenever evidence is adduced that 
concerns the epistemic authority requisite for proper 
assertion, it may bear on the norm of assertion or it 
may bear on these other […] norms. […][I]t will be 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to tell which is 
being defended (Lackey 2011, 277).  
 
Consider, also, Stewart Cohen’s (admittedly somewhat more 
general) worry about this issue: 
 
[E]pistemologists’ use of the term ‘epistemic’ has led 
to serious confusion in the discussion of 
epistemological issues. The source of the problem is 
that ‘epistemic’ functions largely as an undefined 
technical term. [T]his confusion has infected 
discussions of the nature of epistemic justification, 
epistemic norms for evidence gathering, and 
knowledge norms for assertion and belief (2016, 839). 
 
These considerations all highlight that giving a clear enough 
criterion for individuating epistemic norms (or ‘epistemic norms’) 
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is a task we epistemologist need to tackle with some degree of 
urgency.  
 
 
3. Desiderata 
 
Now that we have a good understanding of just why we need an 
individuation criterion for distinctively epistemic norms, let’s ask 
what makes a candidate criterion a good one? I’d like to propose 
the following desiderata.  
 
1. INDEPENDENCE. We want the criterion to delineate a class 
of norms that is independent from other classes of norms.  
 
2. GENERALITY. We want our criterion to be generalizable, in 
the sense that it can, after normative-domain-relative 
interventions, be employed not only serve to delineate 
distinctively epistemic norms but also distinctively moral norms, 
prudential norms, etc.  
 
3. THEORETICAL ADEQUACY. We want our individuation 
recipe to accommodate properties of type-specific norms that are 
widely recognized in the general theory of normativity. What’s 
more, we’d want this to be the case not only for the specific 
criterion for epistemic norms but also for the generalized version 
of it (by GENERALITY).  
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4. INTUITIVE ADEQUACY. Finally, we want the criterion to 
be extensionally adequate in the sense that it makes correct 
classifications: ideally, we want it to successfully capture our 
intuitions when it comes to classifying all epistemic norms as 
epistemic and all non-epistemic norms as non-epistemic. Also, 
again, we want this to be the case not only for specifically 
epistemic norms but (by GENERALITY) also for other types of 
norms (prudential, moral, etc.). To repeat, since our handle on the 
meaning of ‘epistemic’ is less than perfect, we’ll have to proceed 
with care. That said, there do appear to be some clear-cut cases. 
For instance, whatever the individuation recipe we come up with 
for epistemic norms, it should better not classify ‘One ought to 
change a flat tire on one’s car!’ as an epistemic norm. What’s 
more, in cases involving at least some non-epistemic norms, e.g. 
moral ones, we have a better handle on the meaning and so we 
may be better positioned to make the relevant verdicts.  
 
5. THEORY NEUTRALITY. We want our individuation recipe 
to be theory neutral; that is, we do not want to individuate the 
epistemic in such a way as to, for instance, only vindicate 
epistemic externalism; rather, what we need is for epistemic 
normativity, whatever it turns out to be, to still allow questions 
such as: ‘Does epistemic permissibility depend on factors external 
to the mind?’ to afford a non-trivial answer.   
 THEORY NEUTRALITY may seem pretty 
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straightforward. And one even may wonder whether it’s worth 
mentioning at all. After all, won’t any criterion for individuating 
epistemic norms satisfy it? The answer here is no. To see why, 
consider the following criterion, which is popular especially 
among epistemologists in the reliabilist camp:  
 
GOAL INDIVIDUATION (GI). A norm N is an epistemic 
norm if and only if following it is conducive to reaching epistemic 
goals (like truth, knowledge etc.).5 
 
The trouble with GI is that it does not satisfy THEORY 
NEUTRALITY. Here is an argument by Stewart Cohen to this 
effect: 
 
Evidentialists, and in particular mentalist 
evidentialists, hold that the justification of a belief 
supervenes on the internal states of the subject. It is 
consistent with such a view that subjects with 
justified beliefs are radically deceived. To say at the 
outset that necessarily most justified beliefs are true 
would disqualify mentalist evidentialism by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Here is a characteristic expression of GI by Peter Graham: 
  
Epistemic norms in this sense govern what we ought to say, do or think from 
an epistemic point of view, from the point of view of promoting true belief 
and avoiding error (Graham 2012). 
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description of the subject matter (2016, 840). 
 
The result is that THEORY NEUTRALITY isn’t straightforward 
at all. In fact, there has been a growing number of epistemologists 
have been rather pessimistic about the prospects of satisfying this 
desideratum (e.g. Cohen (2016), Alston (2005) and Hazlett 
(2016)). In fact, Cohen and Hazlett both go on to argue that, as a 
result, we should eliminate ‘epistemic’ from our philosophical 
lexicon altogether. According to Cohen, we should “simply 
identify epistemic justification with the rationality of belief […] 
The virtue of this approach is that we could simply dispense with 
the problematic technical vocabulary replacing it with a natural 
language expression.” And here is Hazlett’s recommendation: 
 
I propose an exercise along these lines. Take any 
contemporary philosophical essay, and consider each 
use of “epistemic.” I submit that each is either 
superfluous – in which case to be stricken – or 
replaceable with alternative jargon – in which case to 
be so replaced (2016, 547).  
 
 
 
Given that several epistemologists have been pessimistic about 
the prospects of satisfying THEORY NEUTRALITY and have 
even taken this to motivate as drastic a view as eliminativism 
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about the epistemic, the importance of offering an individuation 
criterion that satisfies this desideratum cannot be understated.  
 
 
4. Content Individuation 
 
With these desiderata in play, let’s return to the received view in 
epistemology. Here it is:  
 
CONTENT INDIVIDUATION (CI). A norm, N, is a 
distinctively epistemic norm if and only if it regulates the 
epistemic properties required for proper phi-ing. 
 
In more transparent talk, CI says that when we ask what the 
epistemic norm for phi-ing is, what we are asking is, roughly, how 
much warrant does one need for permissible phi-ing? One can 
find CI implicitly assumed in most of the literature discussing the 
epistemic normativity of belief, assertion or action in the last 
decade.6 Philosophers ask, for instance, whether justification is 
enough for permissible assertion/belief/action etc, or more – 
knowledge, certainty – is needed. When they ask these questions, 
they take themselves to be inquiring into the epistemic norms for 
assertion/belief/action. Furthermore, CI is also, often enough, 
explicitly endorsed; take, for instance, the following passages:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 For a nice overview, see e.g. Benton (2014). For recent work see (Littlejohn 
and Turri 2014). 
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[T]he problem with the agents in the above cases is 
that it is not epistemically appropriate for them to flat-
out assert that p […]. One reason this is clear is that 
the criticism of the agents concerns the grounds for 
their assertions.  (Lackey 2013, 38)  
 
According to Lackey, then, insofar as one is criticized for the 
grounds for their assertion, the criticism is warranted by a 
corresponding epistemic norm. Lackey makes a sufficiency claim 
here: according to her, criticism concerning epistemic grounds is 
enough for criticism sourced in an epistemic norm. Here is also 
Ishani Maitra: 
 
Assertions are governed by an alethic or an epistemic 
norm – that is, a norm that specifies that it is 
appropriate to assert something only if what is 
asserted is true, or justifiably believed, or certain or 
known.” (Maitra 2011, 277).  
 
In Maitra’s view, then, when a norm stipulates an epistemic 
condition (justification, knowledge etc) for appropriate assertion, 
the norm in question is epistemic. Again, Maitra’s claim is a 
sufficiency claim. From a different angle, Alan Hazlett makes a 
methodological point that points in the same direction: 
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[The epistemic] is sometimes used to mean (roughly) 
“of or relating to knowledge” […]. However, 
“epistemic” is sometimes used to mean (roughly) “of 
or relating to belief”. (Hazlett 2016, 540) 
 
 On the face of it, CI appears to satisfy all of the 
desiderata. After all, CI does offer necessary and sufficient 
conditions for what it takes for a norm to count as distinctively 
epistemic as INDEPENDENCE requires. It also appears to be 
generalizable into a criterion for typing norms other than 
epistemic norms (GENERALITY). In the absence of any specific 
reason for thinking THEORETICAL ADEQUACY isn’t 
satisfied, there is no direct cause for concern on this front either. 
Finally, it seems to make acceptable classifications: For instance, 
the norm that requires you to assert only what you know comes 
out as epistemic, as does the norm that requires you to believe 
only what you have evidence for. On the other hand, the norm 
that tells you to change a flat tire on your car doesn’t. Finally, CI 
promises to satisfy THEORY NEUTRALITY. After all, while CI 
individuates epistemic norms by epistemic content it remains 
neutral on what counts as distinctively epistemic content. To the 
extent that concerns about THEORY NEUTRALITY has fueled 
pessimism about offering a workable criterion for individuating 
distinctively epistemic norms, CI holds out the hope of resisting 
such pessimism.  
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 Unfortunately, on closer inspection, there is reason to 
think that CI remains unsatisfactory after all. And it is not 
THEORY NEUTRALITY that causes trouble here. Rather, as I 
am about to show, CI satisfies neither THEORETICAL nor 
INTUITIVE ADEQUACY. I’ll discuss the former first and them 
move on to the latter.  
 Recall that THEORETICAL ADEQUACY requires 
champions of CI to accommodate properties of norms that are 
widely recognized in the general theory of normativity, both for 
epistemic norms and in general. To assess whether CI can satisfy 
THEORETICAL ADEQUACY, we first need to have a quick 
look at what the generalized version of this criterion. The key is 
of course that type-specific norms in general are individuated by 
their content, in the relevant way. Here is a straightforward 
proposal for such a generalization:  
 
CI-GEN: A norm, N, is a norm of type T if and only if it 
regulates the properties of type T required for proper7 phi-ing. 
 
With CI-GEN in play, I’d now like to look at a widely-recognized 
property of norms in the general theory of normativity. Norms 
can come in conflict with each other. When this happens, one 
norm may override another. Moreover, there are at least two ways 
in which normative overriding may pan out. Here is one:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Of course, propriety itself comes in types, i.e. epistemic, moral, prudential etc. 
See below for this. 
	   16	  
 
OVERRIDE1. Norm N1 of type T1 (moral, prudential, etc.) 
permits phi-ing. N1 is overridden by another norm, N2 of type 
T2 (moral, prudential, etc., which may but need not = T1), which 
prohibits phi-ing, with the result that phi-ing is all-things-
considered improper altogether. 
 
By way of illustration, consider a case in which you are playing 
chess,8 and someone shows up, puts a gun to your head and 
threatens to kill you unless you move the bishop horizontally. 
Here, doing what is permissible by the norms of chess – say, 
moving the bishop diagonally – is all-things-considered improper: 
an overriding prudential norm renders the relevant action altogether 
improper.  
 It’s important to note that, while OVERRIDE1 is one 
way in which normative overriding can manifest itself, it isn’t the 
only way in which this can happen. Consider: 
 
OVERRIDE2. Norm N1 of type T1 (moral, prudential, etc.) 
permits phi-ing conditional on having enough of gradable 
property P. N1 is overridden by another norm, N2 of type T2 
(moral, prudential, etc., which may but need not = T1), which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For the purposes of this paper, I employ a very permissive sense of ‘norm’ to 
include hypothetical, as well as categorical imperatives, constitutive as well as 
merely conventional regulations etc. Nothing hinges on this. 
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modifies the P-threshold for all-things-considered proper phi-ing 
up or down. 
 
By way of illustration, consider a case in which you are driving 
down a road such that the traffic norm in place requires you to 
drive between 40 and 70mph. Unfortunately for you, your 
kidnapper is holding a gun to your head and threatens to kill you 
unless you drive between 80 and 100mph. Once again, a 
prudential norm overrides – in this case the traffic norm in place. 
Unlike in the chess case, here the overriding norm does not 
render the action altogether improper. Rather, what happens is 
that prudential requirements modify the all-things-considered 
proper speed up.  
Here is another important property associated with 
overriding: 
 
OVERRIDE-FORCE. When a norm N1 of type T1 is 
overridden by a norm N2 of type T2 such that T1 ≠ T2, N1 
remains the relevant norm of type T1 in place.  
 
For instance, in the above chess case, when prudential norms 
override the chess norm that permits you to move the bishop 
diagonally, this norm remains the relevant chess norm in place. In 
other words, the threat to your life does not change the rules of 
chess. Likewise, when moral/prudential norms override the 
traffic norm requiring you to drive between 40 and 70 mph, this 
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norm remains the traffic norm in place. In other words, a threat 
to your life does not change the traffic norm.9  
 Of course, in order to satisfy THEORETICAL 
ADEQUACY, CI-GEN must accommodate normative 
overriding. That is to say, it must allow for normative overriding 
along the lines of both OVERRIDE1 and 2 whilst respecting 
OVERRIDE-FORCE. Unfortunately, there is excellent reason 
for thinking that CI-GEN doesn’t deliver on this front. In 
particular, it cannot accommodate OVERRIDE2 whilst 
respecting OVERRIDE-FORCE. To see why not, let’s return to 
the above case in which the operative traffic norm requires 
driving between 40 and 70mph. In the case under consideration, 
your kidnapper will kill you unless you drive between 80 and 
100mph, with the result that the traffic norm is overridden by a 
prudential norm which modifies the requirement for the all-
things-considered proper speed up (as per OVERRIDE2). At the 
same time, by OVERRIDE-FORCE, the traffic norm remains 
unchanged. The threat to your life doesn’t change the traffic 
norms in place. 
 The trouble for CI-GEN is that it cannot accommodate 
this account of what is going on here. According to CI-GEN, 
norms are typed by the type of property they are regulating. The 
operative traffic norm is a traffic norm in virtue of the fact that its 
compliance condition features a traffic-related property, i.e. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Otherwise put, the traffic requirement is merely overriden rather than 
swamped at the context. 
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speed. Note, though, that if driving at a speed between 40 and 
70mph  is a property pertaining to traffic, then so is driving at a 
speed between 80 and 100mph. CI-GEN is thus firmly 
committed to holding that the norm requiring you to drive 
between 80 and 100mph in this case is also a traffic norm, in 
virtue of regulating a traffic-related property, i.e. speed. CI-GEN 
must thus hold that, in the case at hand, the threat to your life 
does change the traffic norm in place, contrary to OVERRIDE-
FORCE. As a result, CI-GEN fails THEORETICAL 
ADEQUACY. And that’s of course bad news for CI, too.  
 It will come as no great surprise that CI-GEN also fails 
on INTUITIVE ADEQUACY. In the traffic case, for instance, 
the norm requiring you to drive between 80 and 100mph is clearly 
not a traffic norm. CI-GEN thus fails INTUITIVE 
ADEQUACY, which is already bad news for champions of CI. 
Furthermore, notice that the case of traffic is hardly isolated. 
Similar examples can be construed for many types of normativity, 
provided that the norms in question regulate how much of a 
gradable property one’s phi-ing needs to enjoy in order to be 
permissible. It can be, for instance, morally appropriate to drive 
faster or slower, to have a better or a worse grade average, to 
wear a longer or a shorter skirt at a funeral, to speak louder or 
more quietly – all this, in spite of the fact that speed, grade 
average, skirt length and loudness of speech are not moral 
properties. Just because a norm regulates the appropriate length 
of one’s skirt, it need not follow it is a fashion norm. Just because 
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a norm has T- content, that is, it regulates a T-property, it need 
not follow it is a T- norm.  
 Finally, there is even reason to think that CI itself does 
little better. To see this, consider: 
 
SING. One must: only sing songs one knows. 
JUMP. One must: jump in the lake only if one knows how to 
swim. 
TOUCH. One must: touch the wire only if one is certain that it is 
not live. 
 
I submit that SING, JUMP and TOUCH are not epistemic 
norms. What seems much more plausible, intuitively, is that 
SING is an aesthetic norm while JUMP and TOUCH are 
prudential norms. At the same time, it is undeniable that all three 
norms have epistemic content, i.e. their compliance conditions 
feature epistemic properties. This means that CI readily classifies 
them as epistemic norms. Since that’s at odds with intuition, there 
is reason to think that CI does not satisfy INTUITIVE 
ADEQUACY.  
 While CI may initially have seemed to do well when it 
comes to satisfying the desiderata on an adequate individuation 
criterion for types of norm, on reflection, it turns out that 
appearances are misleading. CI fails to satisfy two key desiderata, 
to wit THEORETICAL and INTUITIVE ADEQUACY. What’s 
worse, the bulk of these failures are not specific to CI. Rather, the 
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generalized version of CI, CI-GEN, does so too. By the same 
token, there is excellent reason to think that the prospects for 
individuating norms by their content are dim. We’ll do well to 
look for an alternative and less problematic criterion.  
 Before moving on, I’d like to offer a brief diagnosis of 
just why CI and CI-GEN fail. The trouble with both CI and CI-
GEN is that the standard story about overriding in the general 
theory of normativity rests on a distinction between norms of a 
certain type, T, and non-T norms with T-content – i.e., regulating 
T-properties. What’s going on in the problematic cases is that a 
norm of one type, T1 (traffic/epistemic), is overridden by a norm 
of a different type, T2 (moral/prudential), that has T1-related 
(traffic/epistemic) content and calls the shots for the all-things-
considered proper action. And, of course, that just couldn’t be the 
case according to CI and CI-GEN. After all, according to these 
views, norms are typed by content, there cannot be distinction 
between a norm of type T and a norm with T-related content.  
 
 
5.  Value Individuation 
 
The ambition of this section is to propose a novel way of 
individuating epistemic norms that improves on CI  - in that it is 
both theoretically and intuitively adequate  - and on GI  - in that 
it is theory neutral. To lay my cards right on the table, here it is: 
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VALUE INDIVIDUATION (VI).  A norm N is of type T if and 
only if it is associated with values of type T. 
 
For instance, norms are prudential norms if and only if associated 
with prudential goods, norms are moral norms if and only if they 
are associated with moral goods and so on. All normative 
domains have goods (values) that are central to them, in virtue of 
the kind of normative domains they are: survival is a prudential 
good; promise keeping is a moral good; politeness is a social 
good; beauty is an aesthetic good; money is a financial good.  
Similarly, if etymology is a guide to what normative domain ‘the 
epistemic’ is supposed to delineate, knowledge is an epistemic 
good. On pain of legitimacy loss, philosophers cannot just 
stipulate that, starting tomorrow, they will use ‘moral’ to refer to a 
type of normative domain that does not care about promise 
keeping, but does care about money, or ‘financial’ to refer to a 
domain of which the chief good is safe driving. Similarly, it would 
be odd to count wealth and having short nails amongst epistemic 
goods.  If all this is the case, however, it will be helpful to 
individuate norms by the goods associated with them, in virtue of 
the latter being (more) easily identifiable.10 
 Now, VI is still rather vague, and, on pain of intuitive 
inadequacy, the association relation at stake should better be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Many thanks to XXX for pressing me on this one. 
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spelled out in more detail. After all, one way in which a norm can 
be associated with a particular good is by requiring more or less 
thereof; this, however, of course, will get us back in the same 
trouble as CI: just because a norm requires me to know how to 
swim in order to jump in the lake, and is thereby somehow 
associated with an epistemic good – i.e., knowledge – it does not 
follow it is an epistemic norm. 
 The proposal here is this: the association relation stands 
direction of explanation: either the axiological explains the 
deontic, or the other way around. That is, either goods explain the 
norms – i.e. the norms are there in order to guide us in reaching 
the goods - , or the other way around, i.e. we only value the 
relevant goods to begin with in virtue of the associated norms.11  
 More about this in a short while; for now, with VI in play, 
let’s ask how this view fares with respect to our desiderata. I take 
it to be obvious that INDEPENDENCE and GENERALITY 
are satisfied and for that reason won’t discuss them in any detail 
here. What I’d like to focus on instead is the remaining ones, 
starting with INTUITIVE ADEQUACY.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 For an argument from VI to there being no epistemic norm for action, but 
only an epistemic norm for practical reasoning – in virtue of the latter, but not 
the former, being plausibly conducive to epistemic goods – see Author 
(Forthcoming). For a defence of the sufficiency direction of the knowledge 
norm of assertion via VI, see Author (2016). For an argument to the effect that 
VI renders the knowledge norm of assertion perfectly compatible with classical 
invariantism, see Author (2017).   
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Let’s start by returning to the traffic case. As a first 
observation, I take it that the fundamental value in the domain of 
traffic is the safe passage from one location to another. According 
to VI, then, a norm is a traffic norm if and only if it is associated 
with the traffic value of safe passage. In the case we were 
considering, driving between 40 and 70mph is clearly thus 
associated. As a result, the norm requiring you to do so is a traffic 
norm, which is of course the desired result. In contrast, in the 
case in which you face death unless you drive between 80 and 
100mph, driving at this speed is not associated with the traffic 
value of safe passage, especially when everyone else is bound only 
by the standard traffic norm. Rather, what it is associated with is a 
prudential value: your survival. VI thus delivers the correct result 
that the norm requiring you to drive between 80 and 100mph is a 
moral/prudential norm, not a traffic norm.  
It is also not hard to see that the same goes for the non-
epistemic norms with epistemic content that caused trouble for 
CI. SING, which requires you to sing only songs you know, is 
associated with the aesthetic value of harmony and so comes out 
as an aesthetic norm. JUMP, which requires you to only jump 
into the lake if you know how to swim, and TOUCH, which 
requires you only to touch the wire if you know it’s not live, are 
associated with the prudential value of your survival, and thus are 
(adequately) classified as prudential norms. In this way, VI can 
avoid the threat to intuitive inadequacy that CI succumbs to. 
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 What about THEORETICAL ADEQUACY? There is 
reason to believe that VI also does well on this front. To return to 
the traffic case once more, we have already seen that the norm 
requiring you to drive between 40 and 70mph is a traffic norm 
and the norm requiring you to drive between 80 and 100mph is a 
prudential norm. What is going on here according to VI, then, is 
that the prudential norm overrides the traffic norm and calls the 
shots for the all-things-considered proper speed. More 
specifically, it modifies the all-things-considered proper speed up, 
just as OVERRIDE2 would have it. At the same time, it leaves 
the norm requiring you to drive between 40 and 70 mph 
untouched. That is to say, this norm remains the operative traffic 
norm, in line with OVERRIDE-FORCE. As a result, VI 
improves on CI here, too. 
 Finally, let’s turn to the troublesome THEORY 
NEUTRALITY. Recall that the association relation stands for 
one or another direction of explanation: either the values explain 
the norm, or the other way around. To see how this goes, it may 
be worth noting that VI is widely uncontroversial and value-
theoretically neutral in the sense that it does not come with any 
substantive commitments about the relation between the 
axiological and the deontic. That is because the association claim 
between norms and goals of the same type does not imply any 
particular direction of explanation. As a result, it is compatible 
with both of the two leading views on the market about the 
relationship between the axiological and the deontic. The 
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teleologist (e.g. Moore (1903), Sidwick (1907), Slote (1989)) 
explains the ‘ought’ in terms of the ‘value’; he will say that the 
norm of type X is there to guide us in reaching the value of type 
X. Here is one (although, by no means, the only)12 easy 
teleological way to spell VI out: 
 
VI-TEL.  A norm N is of type T if and only if complying with it 
is conducive to acquiring values of type T. 13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In what follows, to be clear, I am only spelling VI out for illustration 
purposes; many more incarnations than the ones proposed are possible, of 
course. For instance, note that VI-TEL is explicitely formulated in rule-
consequentialist terms. Of course, a corresponding act-consequentialist way to 
spell it out is also available: roughly, in this case, VI-TEL would classify a norm 
as epistemic iff it delivers the best epistemic outcome on occasion.  
13 One legitimate worry that can arise at this point concerns the sufficiency 
direction of VI (thanks to xxx for pressing me on this): some values are, at the 
same time, plausibly, of more than one type. Take, for instance,  knowledge: it 
is plausible that, apart from it being a fundamental epistemic value, it is also – 
likely, derivatively – a prudential value, since it promotes our survival. But then 
could it not be that the sufficiency claim involved in VI will mistakenly classify 
a prudential norm that is associated with knowledge as epistemic? The answer 
is ‘no’: VI will, indeed, classify any norm that is associated (in the relevant way, 
see the discussion about unpacking the association claim) with knowledge as 
epistemic, in virtue of knowledge being (also) an epistemic value. But that is 
perfectly fine. To see why, note, first, that one and the same norm can be of 
several types. For instance, the norm: ‘Drive safely!’ is a traffic norm, but also, 
plausibly, a prudential norm and a moral norm. Now, take, for instance, a 
teleological direction of explanation: say that, in virtue of knowledge being 
practically useful, you will have a practical norm that asks you to go to school 
	   27	  
 
In contrast, the deontologist (e.g. Scanlon (1998) Ewing (1947), 
Rabinowicz and Rönnow-Rasmussen (2004)) reverses the order 
of explanation: according to ‘Fitting Attitude’ accounts of value, 
for instance, the values of type X are only valuable to begin with 
because the norm of type X gives us reasons to favor them. Here 
is one shape this could take: 
 
VI-DEO.  A norm N is of type T if and only if it gives you 
reason to favor values of type T.14 
 
To see difference between the teleological and the deontological 
direction of explanation more clearly, consider the epistemic 
norm that requires you to believe only what you know.15 Let’s 
also assume that knowledge is a distinctively epistemic value. 
Here is one way to spell out the teleological direction of 
explanation is: complying with the norm of believing only what 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and study hard (in order, say, to acquire lots thereof, and thereby become rich). 
The question is: is it fine to classify this practical norm: ‘Go to school!’ as also 
being epistemic? The correct answer seems to be ‘yes’. After all, this norm is 
just as conducive to epistemic flourising as is, for instance, ‘Follow your 
evidence!’ (which, again, is plausibly both an epistemic and a practical norm). 
In fact, in virtue of the fact that, plausibly, epistemic values are generally 
speaking also practically and morally valuable, this should hardly be surprising.   
14 For a general overview of the relevant literature in value theory, see e.g. 
Schroeder (2012). 
15 Defended, most notably, in Williamson (2000). 
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you know is conducive to acquiring knowledge. And since 
knowledge is an epistemic value, the knowledge norm of belief is 
conducive to acquiring an epistemic value and so comes out as a 
distinctively epistemic norm. In contrast, the deontologist does 
not take the norm to derive from the value. Rather, the thought 
here is that the norm requiring you to believe only what you 
know is fundamental and the fact that it gives us reason to favor 
knowledge explains why knowledge is a value in the first place. 
Since knowledge is an epistemic value, however, and since the 
knowledge norm of belief gives us reason to favor an epistemic 
value, it comes out as a distinctively epistemic norm. Crucially, in 
either case, the mere association claim at issue in VI holds.16  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Both the teleological and the deontological version of VI work in this case. 
Crucially, this is not to say that they will both work equally well in all cases. 
Straightforward incarnations of the teleological view, for instance, run into 
trouble with cases like the following, which are all too familiar from the ethics 
literature: Let’s grant happiness is a moral value and consider a case in which 
you can make twenty people extremely happy by killing one scapegoat. The 
relevant straighforward teleological incarnation of VI would appear to predict 
that there is a moral norm requiring you to kill the scapegoat, which doesn’t 
seem right. But that’s not reason to think that VI isn’t correct or theory 
neutral. Rather, it’s just reason to think that the straightforward teleological 
incarnation of VI is false. Or take the VI-Deo verdict on SING: since SING 
gives one reasons to favor knowledge, it would seem to classify it as an 
epistemic norm. Again, this is not a problem for VI, but rather for the 
deontologist: teleology will just do better on this count. Importantly, VI stays 
neutral on which of these incarnations is the correct one. 
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 Since VI can be unpacked along both teleological and 
deontological lines, it promises to satisfy THEORY 
NEUTRALITY. In particular, note that even if Cohen is right 
and a teleological version of VI rules out evidentialist mentalism 
as a view about distinctively epistemic justification (because it 
requires conduciveness to an epistemic value), the deontological 
version of VI can certainly accommodate the evidentialist 
mentalist since it just takes the relevant norm the view espouses 
as fundamental and explains the corresponding value in terms of 
it.   
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper proposed a novel way to individuate epistemic norms 
- Value Individuation -, and argued that the proposed individuation 
scheme does well in meeting a number of desiderata for any such 
account. In a nutshell, the proposal is to type norms by the type 
of good they are associated with, where the association relation is 
spelled out as direction of explanation. 
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